

A Statistical Anomaly Detection Approach for Detecting Network Attacks

Roland Kwitt

Salzburg Research &
Univ. of Applied Sciences and Technologies Salzburg

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Outline

Introduction

Connection Between Anomalies and Attacks

Towards a Statistical Approach

The Basics

System Description

Preliminary Results

Further Work

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Connection Between Anomalies and Attacks

- ▶ Determining the correspondence between malicious activity and anomalous activity is essential, but not an easy task!
- ▶ Based on a generally very huge feature space, a subset of features has to be extracted from which the system can learn a *normal* behavior model
- ▶ It is common practice that such models are based on the distributions of the observed features
- ▶ Many attacks rely on the ability of an attacker to construct client protocols themselves. Usually, the target environment is not duplicated carefully

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Connection Between Anomalies and Attacks (contd.)

- ▶ Network probes and scans are necessarily anomalous since they try to seek information legitimate users already possess
- ▶ Already successfully executed attacks against a victim host/network often result in so called *response anomalies*
 - ▶ Hosts/networks used as traffic amplifiers in DRDoS attacks often show response anomalies
- ▶ A thorough description in which way attacks cause anomalies is not possible!
- ▶ The power of employing anomaly detection regarding attacks, lies in the fact that you do not need to know anything about an attack!

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- ▶ While we monitor traffic we observe certain packet header fields (our features) and estimate the parameters of their underlying distribution
- ▶ But, how are the header field values distributed ?
- ▶ Let a random variable X indicate whether a header field takes on a certain value (denoted by event A , $p := \mathbb{P}(A)$) or not. This simulates a Bernoulli experiment since we only have two outcomes. Thus it follows that

$$X(w) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } w \in A \\ 0 & \text{if } w \notin A \end{cases} \rightsquigarrow X \sim \text{Bernoulli}(p) \quad (1)$$

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The Basics (contd.)

- ▶ We repeat the same basic random experiment n times. Let another random variable Y indicate the number of successes: $Y = \#\{i : X_i = 1, i = 1, \dots, n\}$. We get

$$Y = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i \rightsquigarrow Y \sim B_{n,p} \quad (2)$$

- ▶ However, we observe the whole domain D of a header field! Thus, $A_1 \cup \dots \cup A_k = \Omega$, $k = 1, \dots, \#D$.
- ▶ The combined probability function of Y_1, \dots, Y_n , $Y_i \sim B_{n,p_i}$, is given by the multinomial distribution.

$$Z \sim Mn_{n,p_1,\dots,p_n} \quad (3)$$

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- ▶ By assuming that we have enough anomaly-free training traffic, it is possible to estimate the parameters of the header field specific multinomial distribution. Lets call this the *nominal profile*.
- ▶ We also define a packet window of the last N packets, which is shifted one position per new packet arrival. Parameters estimation of the window specific multinomial distribution leads to a *current traffic profile*.
- ▶ The maximum likelihood estimator \hat{p}_i for the probabilities of a multinomial distribution is $\hat{p}_i = \frac{n_i}{n}$ where n_i denotes the number of occurrences of element i .
- ▶ We can now calculate the deviation of the current parameters from the expected parameters for normal traffic.

$$d_i = p_{i \text{ nominal}} - p_{i \text{ current}} \quad (4)$$

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
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
Visualization

- ▶ Multinomial distribution of the nominal traffic profile (illustrated as bar chart)



Visualization (contd.)

- ▶ Multinomial distribution under an attack (window length equals the length of the nominal profile observation period)



Change Recognition

- ▶ Calculate the empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of the oscillations around the expected mean
- ▶ Additionally calculate the same ECDF for the last N oscillation values (again *sliding window principle*)
- ▶ \rightsquigarrow Two sample Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Chi-Square . . .)
- ▶ Problem: Too slow when employed at monitoring systems for high speed links ! Optimal: solution with $O(1)$ complexity
- ▶ The difference between the areas under both ECDFs can be calculated iteratively

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More Optimizations

- ▶ While estimating the parameters of the multinomial distributions the constraint $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1$ must be met.
- ▶ A normalization step after each packet arrival would be needed \rightsquigarrow computationally expensive (especially for large domains)
- ▶ Due to our iterative *integral* test, only the correct probability for the value that has occurred in the current packet is needed.
- ▶ Normalization in each step is now obsolete! Result: $O(1)$ complexity of the update routine

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Results

- ▶ Evaluation of our approach against the DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Data Set
- ▶ The analysis algorithms are no longer the performance bottleneck, but the capture routines (even in case of offline analysis)
- ▶ Monitored protocols and fields are
 - ▶ IP (protocol, ToS, total length)
 - ▶ TCP (flags, source port, destination port)
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 - ▶ ICMP (ICMP type, ICMP code)

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
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Visualization

- ▶ Analysis of one day of training data (no attacks) and one day of attack data for host *marx*



Further Work

- ▶ Increase the subset of observed features
- ▶ Include features based on measurements on a higher abstraction level
- ▶ Reduce the yet high dimensionality vector to some reasonable one dim. anomaly indicator

Thanks for your attention!